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 Mega-sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries 
often justify the spending required to stage these events by predicting that mega-events will draw 
large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly foreign tourist arrivals into Brazil 
between 2003 and 2015 and finds that the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign tourism by 
roughly one million visitors. This number far exceeded expectations, but we show that roughly a 
quarter of this increase in foreign tourism was caused by the fortuitous advancement of 
Argentina’s national team, and potential hosts should not count on the event to consistently 
produce out-sized tourism figures  We conclude that on-field results can greatly influence FIFA 
World Cup tourism. 
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 Major international sporting events are considered valuable prizes by many countries, and 
the competition to host these events can be vigorous. In order to justify the costs of hosting, it is 
often claimed that these events attract large numbers of well-heeled foreign visitors and can be 
engines of economic growth after the event. The 2014 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association) World Cup is no exception. Leading up to the event, the Brazilian Ministry 
of Sports forecasted the event would be worth no less than $70 billion and attract 600,000 
tourists to Brazil.1 Such claims were probably necessary to justify the extraordinary expense to 
host the event. The Brazilian Ministry of Sports reported stadium construction cost $3.6 billion.2 
FIFA concedes that the overall cost of the event was $15 billion, though the organization 
contributed $2 billion towards operational costs.3  
 Unfortunately hosting decisions must be made on ex ante predictions of economic 
impact, which have a significant amount of variation and can be manipulated by those in favor of 
hosting. For example, the consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted 
483,000 international visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The firm revised 
their figures downward multiple times, once to “a gross economic impact of $12 billion to the 
country’s economy” with 373,000 international visitors (Voigt, 2011), and then subsequently 
placing the economic impact at $7.5 billion along with 198,400 annual jobs (Rihlamvu, 2011).  
Following the event, a report suggested “309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for the 
                                                          
1 Rapoza, Kenneth, “FIFA World Cup Forecast To Add $70 Billion To Brazil's Economy”, Forbes, July 8 2011.  
2 Manfred, Tony, “What Brazil's Brand-New $3.6-Billion World Cup Stadiums Look Like”, Business Insider, June 
9 2014.  
3 FIFA, “FAQ: Setting the Record Straight”, 




primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup” and spent 3.64 billion rand (roughly 
$500 million using contemporaneous exchange rates) during their stay (FIFA, 2010). While ex 
ante predictions can be useful, ex post economic impact estimates for similar events should also 
be considered. This is perhaps more vital in recent years as FIFA World Cups and Olympiads 
have been held in developing countries hoping to use the event to spur economic growth, e.g. 
Brazil (2014 FIFA World Cup, 2016 Summer Olympics), South Africa (2010 FIFA World Cup), 
and Russia (2012 Winter Olympics, 2018 FIFA World Cup).  
This paper has two contributions. First, we estimate the net impact of the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup on foreign tourism into Brazil. Using monthly tourist arrival data from 2003 to 2015, 
we estimate the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign visitors to Brazil by about one million 
people, which is significantly higher than government expectations of 600,000 prior to the event. 
Second, we identify a substantial source of variation to any ex ante economic impact prediction 
of the FIFA World Cup: on-field results. The FIFA World Cup finals begin with 32 teams, each 
of which is guaranteed three games during the “group stage” of the tournament. The outcomes of 
the group stage leave 16 teams in the “knockout round”, which comprises of single elimination 
games. In terms of foreign tourism, the best scenario for the host country is that a nearby 
competitor will advance deep into the knockout round, which will attract its fans to the host 
country. Fortunately for Brazil, this is precisely what happened in 2014. Argentina, a populous 
country that shares a border with Brazil, saw its national team advance to the final game of the 
2014 FIFA World Cup. We estimate this exogenous, on-field result had an enormous impact on 
foreign tourism into Brazil, particularly in July 2014 when Argentinians comprised over 80 
percent of the net increase in foreign tourism. Supposing instead that Argentine national team 
was eliminated during its quarterfinal game to Belgium on July 5, 2014, we estimate that roughly 
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250,000 fewer foreign tourists would have entered Brazil during the FIFA World Cup. In 
essence, the advancement of the Argentine national team contributed roughly one-quarter of the 
net increase in foreign tourists attributed to the FIFA World Cup. We conclude that on-field 
results greatly influence the net increase in tourism and therefore the potential economic impact, 
which means any ex ante prediction of an economic payoff from the FIFA World Cup is subject 
to a considerable amount of uncertainty completely out of the control of the event organizers. 
 
Impact Analysis 
 Organizers routinely claim that sporting events have a large impact on host economies 
through the direct spending of tourists, and the FIFA World Cup is no exception. According to 
the consulting firm Deloitte, the 2007 Rugby World Cup attracted over 350,000 overseas visitors 
to France, while the event “can deliver between £260m and £1.1 billion of Gross Value Added to 
a Host Nation, depending on location” (Deloitte, 2008). The United Kingdom’s (UK) 
Department of Transport expected 500,000 tourists and 70,000 athletes and officials for the 2012 
Summer Olympics in London, an increase of 260,000 visitors over a typical summer month (The 
Week, 2012). Early predictions for the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro suggested the 
event would bring an additional 480,000 tourists, with “experts believ[ing] this number could be 
surpassed” (Utley, 2014). 
Impressive tourism predictions are not limited to weeks-long tournaments such as FIFA 
World Cups or the Olympiads. Some tourism estimates for the 2005 National Basketball 
Association All-Star Game were as high as 100,000, even though the event was held in arena that 
has less than 20,000 in capacity (Matheson, 2008). The National Football League’s (NFL) Pro-
Bowl has been predicted to attract nearly 50,000 visitors (Baumann and Matheson, 2016) and the 
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NFL Super Bowl typically claims of tourist flows of 100,000 to 125,000 with some predicting 
that the 2014 game would attract up to 400,000 visitors to the New York City metropolitan area. 
(Prieto, 2014)  
 Of course, the expenses associated with hosting an event like the FIFA World Cup or the 
Olympics are quite large, and the majority of these costs are typically borne by the host country. 
Regarding infrastructure, FIFA requires host countries to have between eight and 12 stadiums 
capable of seating at least 40,000 spectators, and one of these stadiums must have at 80,000 
capacity for the opening and final games. Olympiads require playing facilities for multiple 
sports, housing for 15,000 athletes and officials, and a minimum of 40,000 hotel rooms available 
for spectators. Despite being one of the most popular tourist destinations in South America, Rio 
de Janeiro still required the construction of over 15,000 new hotel rooms for the 2016 Summer 
Games (Baade and Matheson, 2016). The 2010 FIFA World Cup produced $3.9 billion in 
expenses paid by South Africa, including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction costs 
(Voigt, 2010). As noted previously, Brazil’s 2014 FIFA World Cup carried a price tag estimated 
at $15 billion, including at least $3.6 billion in total spending on 12 new or refurbished stadiums.  
 Economists are typically skeptical that mega-events can generate sufficient economic 
benefits to cover the costs of hosting these tournaments (see Baade and Matheson, 2016, or 
Coates and Humphreys, 2008, among others). First, tourism estimates made prior to the event, 
especially if they are published by organizations with a vested interest, may be exaggerated in 
order to increase the amount of public subsidies. Second, if an event draws a primarily local 
audience, then spending at the event does not represent new money to the economy but rather a 
reallocation within the local area. Third, not all tourism spending stays in the local economy, 
particularly for expenditures on goods and services provided by multinational corporations. 
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These leakages reduce the multiplier effect and thereby decrease the amount of economic impact 
generated by the event (Matheson, 2009).  
A fourth issue is “crowding out”, which occurs when the congestion of a mega-event 
dissuades other tourism or business travel to the host region. It is possible that this displacement 
effect may be severe, especially if the event is held during a high tourist season when hotel 
rooms are typically full. The UK Office for National Statistics (2015) reported that the number of 
international visitors to the country during the 2012 Summer Olympics fell to 6.174 million 
visitors compared to 6.568 million the year before, and some popular shows in London’s theater 
district shut down during the Games. Similarly, Beijing similarly reported a 30 percent drop in 
international visitors and a 39 percent drop in hotel occupancy during the month of the 2008 
Summer Olympics compared to the previous year. Utah ski resorts noted a 9.9 percent fall in 
attendance during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and a drop in taxable sales 
collections at these locations compared to the previous year (Zimbalist, 2015; Baade, Baumann, 
and Matheson, 2010). Taxable sales and skier visits rebounded the following season clearly 
implicating the Olympics in the one-time drop. 
While there is a clear relationship, it must be noted that there is not a one to one 
connection between the number of tourists to an event and the event’s economic impact. Often 
visitors to mega-sporting events are considered to be wealthier than the average tourist. Only the 
well-heeled, it is thought, can afford the steep ticket prices and costly accommodations that 
accompany a major event. For example, the average ticket price on secondary markets for Super 
Bowl tickets routinely exceed $2,500, and even the cheapest ticket available to foreigners for the 
2018 World Cup in Russia is $105. (Seatgeek, 2017;  Boehm, 2016)  If sports tourists are 
wealthier, then a major event may cause overall tourism spending to rise even if there is not a net 
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increase in the number of tourists. Heller and Stephenson’s (2017) analysis of hotel receipts 
during mega-events finds that the vast majority of the increase in accommodation revenue during 
the Super Bowl occurs due to an increase in spending per person rather than an increase in the 
number of visitors. On the other hand, certain sports teams may have die-hard fans with bigger 
hearts than wallets. Anecdotally, a large number of Latin American visitors to Brazil during the 
World Cup spent their time sleeping on beaches rather than in luxury hotels. (Zimbalist, 2015). If 
this type of tourist made up a majority of the increase in visitors to the country during the World 
Cup, a significant increase in tourism may not result in a proportionally large increase in visitor 
spending. This analysis differentiates arrivals by air and ground in an attempt to address this 
issue. 
Several academic studies have examined tourism inflows and visitor spending at FIFA 
World Cups. In general, the research finds, at best, modest impacts from hosting. Hagn and 
Maennig (2008) argue that the 1974 FIFA World Cup in Germany “was not able to generate any 
medium to long-term employment effects that were significantly different from zero”. Baade and 
Matheson (2004) estimate that host cities of the 1994 FIFA World Cup in the United States 
experienced a cumulative loss of at least $5.5 billion. Feddersen, Grötzinger, and Maennig 
(2009) could not statistically identify any positive employment or income effects after the 
construction of stadiums for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) examine overnight hotel stays and national tourism income and find no identifiable 
impact in either category in France during the 1998 FIFA World Cup. However, the same study 
estimates the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany produced an increase of approximately 700,000 
additional hotel nights sold to foreigners and an additional 600 to 700 million euros (US$ 830 to 
970 million) in net national tourism income. 
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In the research closest in nature to the analysis performed here, Du Plessis and Maennig 
(2011) and Peeters, Matheson and Szymanski (2014) both examine monthly tourist arrivals into 
South Africa with a focus on the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Both studies find that the country 
experienced an increase in tourism during the months of the tournament, but the net increase in 
tourist arrivals (40,000-80,000 in Du Plessis and Maennig, 2011, and 220,000 in Peeters, et al., 
2014) were a fraction of the levels claimed by event organizers prior to the competition. Finally, 
Sterken (2006) analyzes FIFA World Cups from 1974 to 2004 and finds the event produces no 
discernable impact on per capita gross domestic product in the host country.  
Other analyses of tourism effects from hosting large sporting events find similarly small 
effects. Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi (2009) and Baumann and Matheson (2016) examine 
visitor arrival data in Hawaii around the NFL Pro Bowl and Honolulu Marathon. These articles 
conclude that the net increase in the number of visitors to the state was less than half of the 
number of visiting spectators and participants at these events. Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011) 
use a gravity model of annual bilateral tourism for 200 countries between 1995 and 2006. They 
find that, on average, an international mega-event increases tourist arrivals by roughly eight 
percent in the year of the event, but the results vary widely. The Summer Olympics, FIFA World 
Cup, and Cricket World Cup had the largest positive impacts on tourism while the Winter 
Olympics and Rugby World Cup were associated with reductions in annual tourist numbers.  
 
Data 
Monthly arrival data by foreigners into Brazil are from Anuário Estatístico, which is 
administered by the country’s Ministério do Turismo. Arrival data are available by land, air, and 
water and in aggregate, by  the country of origin of the traveler. In practice, the number of 
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arrivals by water is very small, so the terms “non-air arrivals” and “land arrivals” may be used 
roughly interchangeably. These data are available monthly from January 2003 to December 
2015.  
The quality of any type of economic data is always subject to question especially given 
the endemic corruption that is known to permeate the Brazilian government. That being said, 
tourism data has some distinct advantages over other types of economic data that makes it useful 
for estimating economic impact. Its primary advantage is the ease of collection which likely 
reduces measurement error. The data simply requires the tabulation of foreigners entering in to 
the country, and Brazil has a reasonably limited number of entry points. Visitors fill out a simple 
customs declaration upon arrival and these forms contain all of the information necessary to 
capture the required data. This is a far easy task than collecting data from either thousands of 
individual firms or millions of consumers about a wide variety of products. Furthermore, very 
few business transactions record the national origin of the purchaser making it difficult to 
disentangle purchases by visitors from those made by locals. Finally, visitor data is not subject to 
many of the types of underreporting or manipulation that other data sources face. Businesses 
have a financial incentive to underreport revenues and individuals have the inclination to 
underreport income in order to avoid taxes. Data collected from visitor surveys is subject to a 
wide array of biases well known in the literature (see Diamond and Hausman (1994) for a nice 
discussion). Visitors arriving at an entry point are unable to conceal their presence and generally 
have little reason or little ability to falsify their national origin. Of course, one can never rule out 
outright fraud on the part of the government agencies themselves, but among any governmental 
data source, international arrivals are likely to have among the highest degrees of accuracy, 
especially in a country that is fairly geographically isolated from most other nations. 
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for several versions of the arrival data available from 
Anuário Estatístico.  
Table 1: Mean Arrivals into Brazil 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)  
 






































 Brazil attracts an average of 442,057 foreign visitors each month, and Argentina and the 
United States provide the first and second largest number of foreign visitors to Brazil, 
respectively. Not surprisingly, the distance to Brazil is correlated to both the number of annual 
visits as well as the likelihood of arriving by plane. For example, neighboring Uruguay sends 
roughly as many annual visitors as the much more populous Germany, but German tourists are 
significantly more likely to travel by air. This is an important distinction as it is reasonable to 
conclude that travelers arriving by air are likely to be wealthier than those forced to make the 
1,500 mile, 28 hour trip from Montevideo by car or bus. Note that arrival data counts the 
nationality of the visitor rather than the country from which the tourist is arriving. For example, a 
German citizen who flies to Argentina and then drives into Brazil would be counted as a German 





 We begin with a panel estimation that evaluates the FIFA World Cup’s impact on arrivals 
in Brazil. In order to evaluate how outcomes on the field can lead to large fluctuations in 
tourism, we begin with a difference-in-difference approach. Due to the length of the tournament, 
we establish two treatment groups: countries with national teams in the group stage and the 
knockout round. The group stage, which ran from June 12 to June 26 2014, includes three games 
for each of the tournament’s 32 teams. Half of these teams advance to a single-elimination 
tournament known as the knockout round, which ran from June 28 to July 14 2014. Given this 
timing, we formulate the following difference-in-difference in equation (1). Rather than 
controlling for only group stage and knockout round participant countries, we use a fixed effect 
term for all origin countries. 
2014 2014 	
																										 	 2014 ∗ 2014 ∗  
																										 	∑ ∑            (1) 
Equation (1) can be written for either of our dependent variables, specifically all arrivals 
and arrivals by plane. The parameters  and  measure the increase in tourism from any 
country during the FIFA World Cup months of June and July 2014. The parameters  and  
measure the treatment effect, or the increase in tourism from countries with teams in the group 
stage and knockout round. One complication is that Anuário Estatístico provides country of 
origin data for only 53 countries, and the remaining countries are placed into continent-specific 
“other countries” categories that aggregates visitors from typically small contributors to 
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Brazilian tourism. We omit these from our data set, though our results are not substantially 
affected by their inclusion. Because of this distinction, not all of the national teams in the group 
stage and knockout round have tourism data. Specifically, our data includes tourism data from 23 
of the possible 31 foreign countries in the group stage and 14 of the 15 foreign countries in the 
knockout round.4 We also include monthly dummy variables  to control for seasonal 
variations in tourism and yearly dummy variables  to control for worldwide macroeconomic 
trends that may impact tourism. These are particularly important since the sample frame 
envelops the worldwide economic slowdown during the late 2000s. Because of the monthly and 
yearly dummy variables, time trends do not substantially impact the estimates and are omitted.  
Figure 1 illustrates all tourist arrivals into Brazil for the portion of our data between 
January 2010 and December 2015. The regular spikes in the data indicate seasonal fluctuations 
in Brazilian arrivals, which peak during the southern hemisphere summer months December and 
January. The largest peak occurs in mid-2014, which is the timing of the FIFA World Cup in 
Brazil. The seasonal peaks before and after the World Cup are also interesting. The summer prior 
to the FIFA World Cup had a below average seasonal peak, which suggests some degree of time 
switching behavior from those postponing a trip to Brazil for the tournament. In comparison, the 
summer after the FIFA World Cup had an above average peak in international visitors, which 
may be caused by the promotional benefits of hosting. Roughly 74 percent of arrivals to Brazil 
travel by plane, though it is clear from Figure 1 that this percentage varies by season. In general, 
most of the spike in arrivals that occurs during summer does not happen by airplane. 
                                                          
4 Excluding Brazil, whose national team participated in both the group stage and knockout round, there are 31 
foreign countries in the group stage and 15 in the knockout round at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. We have tourism 
data for all group stage participants except Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Croatia, Ghana, Iran, and 





 Before estimating equation (1), we pause to check whether the data are stationary. We 
employ the standard tests – augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatowski-Perron-
Schmidt-Shin – to test for the presence of a unit root. Because these tests are intended for cross-
sections of time series data (in our sample, arrivals from one country) and not panels, we present 
the results for the aggregated data of all international tourism into Brazil over the sample frame. 
Though not presented for brevity, the stationary tests for cross-sections of each individual 
country are largely similar and available upon request. We use the Ng-Perron approach to find 
the optimal lag structure for these tests. This approach suggests 11 lags in both the all arrivals 
and air arrivals specifications. The following tests do not contain time trends because they do not 
substantially change the outcomes. The results are mixed for the dependent variable in levels. In 
comparison, the first difference of each dependent variable uniformly rejects the presence of a 
unit root. Table 2 presents these test results.  




























	 	 -1.731 
(p = 0.4152) 
-5.010 
(p < 0.001) 
0.868 
(p < 0.01) 
	 	 -1.904 
(p = 0.3303) 
-7.389 
(p < 0.001) 
0.752 
(p < 0.01) 
Δ	 	 	 -7.225 
(p < 0.001) 
-20.553 
(p < 0.001) 
0.263 
(p > 0.1) 
Δ	 	 	 -8.124 
(p < 0.001) 
-28.049 
(p < 0.001) 
0.204 
(p > 0.1) 
Note: Each cell contains the test statistic and p-value. For augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron, the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. For Kwiatowski-Perron-
Schmidt-Shin, the null hypothesis is a stationary time series. Each test uses lag terms from one to 
11.   
 
Because the unit root tests have mixed results, we present two estimations of equation 
(1). Table 3 presents the least squares estimation of equation (1) where the dependent variable is 
measured in levels. We cluster the standard errors at the country-of-origin level in order to 
mitigate heteroskedasticity. In essence, this estimates separate error variances for each country of 
origin. Due to the variation in foreign visitors during the seasonal peaks before and after the 
2014 FIFA World Cup seen in Figure 1, we also include dummy variables for the Brazilian 
summers of December 2013 through February 2014 and December 2014 through February 2015. 
Though not presented for brevity and available upon request, all estimations include dummy 
variables for each year and month.  
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimations  
Dependent Variable  	 ∆ 	 ∆ 	
June 2014 dummy 4,381 
(p = 0.006) 
2,811 
(p < 0.001) 
3,388 
(p = 0.001) 
2,557 
(p < 0.001) 
July 2014 dummy 1,409 
(p = 0.067) 
634 
(p = 0.046) 
2,052 
(p = 0.021) 
1,398 
(p = 0.021) 
June 2014 * Group 
Stage Team 
19,463 
(p = 0.007) 
12,880 
(p = 0.002) 
20,590 
(p = 0.006) 
13,504 
(p < 0.001) 
July 2014 * Knockout 
Round Team 
17,114 
(p = 0.289) 
3,300 
(p = 0.089) 
13,023 
(p = 0.388) 
1,012 
(p = 0.723) 
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Summer 2013/2014 -1,511 
(p = 0.111) 
-709 
(p = 0.001) 
-1,412 
(p = 0.082) 
-426 
(p < 0.001) 
Summer 2014/2015 3,276 
(p = 0.228) 
348 
(p = 0.106) 
245 
(p = 0.690) 
-260 
(p = 0.009) 
 
It is clear from the estimates at Table 3 that the 2014 FIFA World Cup attracted tourists 
from all over the world. For countries without a national team in 2014 FIFA World Cup, we 
estimate that the event attracted between 3,388 and 4,381 visitors per country during June. We 
also estimate a positive bump in international tourism during July 2014. Countries with a 
national team in the group stage attracted an additional 20,000 visitors per country in June. 
Further, countries with national teams in the knockout round brought an additional 13,000 to 
17,000 visitors to Brazil, though these estimates are not statistically significant. It is also notable 
that a large percentage of the July 2014 foreign tourism gains did not arrive by airplane. While 
foreign net air arrivals during July 2014 are positive, their estimates are smaller and less precise 
compared to the estimations that analyze all arrivals to Brazil. We also find some evidence of 
time switching tourism behavior. The summer prior to the 2014 FIFA World Cup had a negative 
impact on net foreign tourism, though we cannot be certain this was caused by tourists delaying a 
trip to Brazil for the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup. In addition, the summer following the 
2014 FIFA World Cup produces a net increase in foreign tourism, which may be caused by the 
promotional benefits of the event. We conclude that the draw of the home country’s national 
team is a powerful force in FIFA World Cup international tourism, and it is important to note 
that all but two of the group stage participants (the host country and previous FIFA World Cup 
champion) are not known at the time when countries bid to host the event.  
 We now turn to estimations for specific countries-of-origin in order to analyze how 
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exogenous outcomes on the field impact international visitors. Because our estimations now use 
cross section data, we omit the group stage, knockout round, and fixed effect controls from 
equation (1) due to perfect collinearity. Each row of Table 4 represents two estimations of 
equation (1): the first set of estimates uses all arrivals to Brazil while the second set uses only 
airplane arrivals. Since Anuário Estatístico provides arrival data for 53 countries, equation (1) 
can be estimated for each country of origin. For brevity, Table 4 only presents estimations for 
total foreign arrivals into Brazil and a subset of countries whose national team participated in at 




Table 4: Least Squares Estimations; Dependent Variable in Levels 













All Countries N/A 696,770 
(p < 0.001) 
318,835 
(p < 0.001) 
474,327 
(p < 0.001) 
92,527 
(p = 0.003) 
U.S.A. Yes 85,073 
(p < 0.001) 
12,686 
(p = 0.008) 
83,900 
(p < 0.001) 
12,221 
(p = 0.007) 
Argentina  Yes 204,772 
(p < 0.001) 
257,633 
(p < 0.001) 
34,555 
(p < 0.001) 
25,838 
(p < 0.001) 
Chile Yes 59,618 
(p < 0.001) 
-6,333 
(p = 0.040) 
28,852 
(p < 0.001) 
-5,678 
(p = 0.041) 
Colombia Yes 38,823 
(p < 0.001) 
1,482 
(p = 0.203) 
34,509 
(p < 0.001) 
1,711 
(p = 0.072) 
Ecuador No 13,853 
(p < 0.001) 
-191 
(p = 0.650) 
13,010 
(p < 0.001) 
12 
(p = 0.978) 
Uruguay No 18,414 
(p < 0.001) 
815 
(p = 0.739) 
7,182 
(p < 0.001) 
-1,821 
(p = 0.035) 
Germany Yes 20,774 
(p < 0.001) 
8,074 
(p < 0.001) 
20,605 
(p < 0.001) 
8,422 
(p < 0.001) 
Belgium No 7,981 63 8,036 56 
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(p < 0.001) (p = 0.822) (p < 0.001) (p = 0.830) 
Note: Each estimation uses Huber/White robust standard errors.  
 
The main result from Table 4 is that the FIFA World Cup increased net foreign arrivals into 
Brazil by about one million people over June and July 2014, and a little more than half of which 
arrived by airplane. The majority of this increase occurs in June, which is also when all 32 teams 
are still competing.   
Of all countries of origin (including those not presented at Table 4), Argentina provided 
the most net arrivals to Brazil during the FIFA World Cup. This is likely driven by Argentina’s 
population, the success of its national team, and the country’s proximity to Brazil. We estimate 
that over 200,000 additional Argentines visited Brazil in June 2014, and this number jumped to 
over 250,000 in July 2014. In fact, we estimate that over 80 percent of the rise in net tourism 
during July comes from Argentina. Further, a large majority of Argentine net arrivals did not 
enter Brazil by airplane. Less than 17 percent arrived by plane in June 2014 and only ten percent 
arrived by plane in July 2014. We will explore this further in the next section, but it is important 
to once again note that not all tourists are created equal when it comes to their impact on the 
Brazilian economy. The fact that the World Cup was associated with large increases in air 
arrivals from rich countries such as the United States and Germany bodes well for the subsequent 
spending in the country after their arrival. This is not necessarily so with the hundreds of 
thousands of Argentinians who arrived by car. Those visitors without the means to avoid the 
arduous trip by land from Argentina to the various Brazilian host cities are unlikely to have spent 
vast sums of money while in the country. 
As the results from the unit root testing are somewhat ambiguous, Table 5 estimates uses 
the first difference of the dependent variable. As with Table 4, month and year are included in all 
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estimations and only a subset of origin locations are presented but all results are available upon 
request.  
Table 5: Least Squares Estimations; Dependent Variable in Differences 













All Countries N/A 676,946 
(p < 0.001) 
296,652 
(p < 0.001) 
472,581 
(p < 0.001) 
94,867 
(p < 0.001) 
U.S.A. Yes 81,444 
(p < 0.001) 
9,300 
(p = 0.004) 
80,649 
(p < 0.001) 
9,251 
(p = 0.003) 
Argentina  Yes 192,981 
(p < 0.001) 
241,513 
(p < 0.001) 
41,076 
(p < 0.001) 
32,367 
(p < 0.001) 
Chile Yes 62,438 
(p < 0.001) 
-4,381 
(p < 0.001) 
32,691 
(p < 0.001) 
-2,079 
(p = 0.140) 
Colombia Yes 38,641 
(p < 0.001) 
1,390 
(p = 0.044) 
34,409 
(p < 0.001) 
1,530 
(p = 0.001) 
Ecuador No 13,897 
(p < 0.001) 
-295 
(p = 0.258) 
13,288 
(p < 0.001) 
422 
(p = 0.535) 
Uruguay No 15,771 
(p < 0.001) 
-2,502 
(p < 0.001) 
7,874 
(p < 0.001) 
-1,536 
(p < 0.001) 
Germany Yes 19,721 
(p < 0.001) 
6,755 
(p < 0.001) 
19,291 
(p < 0.001) 
7,040 
(p < 0.001) 
Belgium Yes 8,044 
(p < 0.001) 
239 
(p = 0.327) 
7,948 
(p < 0.001) 
136 
(p = 0.650) 
Note: Each estimation uses Huber/White robust standard errors.  
 
The results in Table 5 are largely similar to Table 4. In this estimation, the total increase 
in net arrivals is about 973,000 compared to 1.015 million in Table 4. Argentina remains the 
largest arrival country, and also the only group of visitors to increase net arrivals in July 
compared to June.  
Counterfactual: Belgium v. Argentina, July 5, 2014  
While one million net visitors to Brazil is a substantial influx of tourism, it is important to 
note that outcomes on the field play a significant role in FIFA World Cup tourism. On July 5 
2014, Argentina eliminated Belgium by a score of one to zero. The following estimates the 
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impact on net arrivals had Belgium won instead in order to illustrate how on-field results 
influence net tourism.   
 Figures 2 and 3 display net arrivals into Brazil during the FIFA World Cup months June 
and July 2014, respectively, using estimates from Table 3 and other estimations omitted for 
brevity. In June 2014, we estimate net arrivals into Brazil increased by 696,770, which we break 
into seven origin locations. The pie chart for July 2014 is similarly constructed but with five 


















There are two notable aspects of Figures 2 and 3. First, July net arrivals are less than half 
of net arrivals in June. This is not surprising given that half of the teams are eliminated by the 
first week of July. Second, the percentage of net arrivals from Argentina increased substantially 
between June and July: roughly 29.4 percent in June compared to over 80 percent in July.  
Using these results, we estimate net arrivals in Brazil had Argentina lost to Belgium. 
Rather than assuming zero Argentine net arrivals if their national team lost to Belgium, we use 
its neighbor Uruguay, whose national team was eliminated by a loss in the knockout round to 
Colombia on June 29, as a guide. Similarly, we use German net arrivals to estimate the increase 
in Belgian net arrivals had Belgium beat Argentina. The German national team would ultimately 
win the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and this exercise assumes its participation deep into the knockout 
round spurred the increase in German net arrivals.  
Based on the estimates from Table 4, July had roughly 38.9 percent of the German net 
arrivals compared to June. Assuming the same percentage had Belgium advanced further in the 
tournament, this translates to an increase in net arrivals of about 3,100 Belgians. We use a 










to Belgium. July net arrivals from Uruguay are roughly 4.4 percent of the June estimate. 
Assuming the same percentage, we estimate net arrivals from Argentina would be roughly 9,000 
had its national team lost. Comparing these outcomes suggests that the impact of Argentina 
beating Belgium, which only happened by one goal, led to an increase in over 245,000 net 
arrivals. Given the overall increase in net tourism is roughly one million, this translates to one-
quarter of the net increase in Brazilian visitors during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In essence, 
Brazil was fortunate that Argentina advanced deep into the tournament as it spurred a substantial 




Table 5: Counterfactual Estimation 
 Observed July Net 
Arrivals given 
Argentina won 
Estimated July Net 
Arrivals had 
Belgium won 
Net Effect had 
Belgium won 
Belgium 63 3,101           3,038 
Argentina 257,632 9,063 + -248,569 
      -245,531 
	
	 While these comparisons are not perfect, the size of the impact is striking. It is clear from 
this exercise that a substantial amount of tourism is out of the control of FIFA World Cup 
planners. While other counterfactuals are possible, such as changing the outcome of a knockout 
round victory by Colombia over Uruguay, they are small in comparison to Argentina’s 
advancement. We conclude that the uncertainty of on-the-field outcomes introduces a significant 




 We estimate that the 2014 FIFA World Cup attracted an additional one million visitors to 
Brazil over a two-month period. This is a substantial figure considering that the event occurred 
during the typically low-tourism winter months of Brazil. It is also notable that our estimates 
exceeded government predictions prior to the event. This is an improvement over the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup in South Africa, where the net increases in foreign arrivals during the tournament 
were between one quarter and one half of expectations leading up to the event.   
  We also identify a source of substantial variation in tourism: on-field results. Our 
estimates indicate that roughly a quarter of the net increase in tourism occurred because of 
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Argentina’s advancement to the final game. We interpret this finding as a cautionary example to 
any future hosts of the FIFA World Cup: ex ante estimates cannot incorporate on-field outcomes, 
and these outcomes have a significant impacts on tourism. Based on our findings, organizers of 
the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia should hope that European teams from populous countries, 
such as Germany, France, and England, advance deep in the tournament in order to maximize 
foreign tourism and therefore economic impact. Furthermore, the success of these countries 
would be doubly beneficial as they are likely to have relatively wealthy fans who would have the 
ability to spend more while in the country. The majority of Brazil’s tourist windfall came by car 
or bus from Argentina, suggesting a lower economic impact than one might normally expect 
from this number of visitors.  
 It is also worth noting that the impact of on-field results varies across large sporting 
events. For example, it is hard to imagine that Olympic tourism is substantially influenced by the 
advancement of team or athlete to the medal round. However, for other events such as the Super 
Bowl or opening rounds of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament, tourism is likely impacted 
by the proximity of the teams in the game. Nevertheless, despite the unexpectedly large increase 
in tourism due to the FIFA World Cup, this research offers another source of skepticism to any 
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